陳佑任 2007/8/30
David Chalmers在 The hard problem那篇文章中，認為我們不可能對意識有可能作出化約性的解釋。有些人認為此問題是無解的問題，有些人認為意識經驗落在科學的領域之外，而在這篇Natural dualism中，Chalmers接續這個問題的討論，主張非化約性的解釋是我們自然的選項。
Chalmers主張我們應將意識經驗視作基礎的現象，而不被其他物理概念所解釋。對這樣基礎的現象，我們應該提出基本的定律來解釋它，說明它的運作法則，更重要地是，說明意識經驗如何依賴於物理世界。自然地，這樣的主張是一種二元論，因為它在物理的領域之外假設了心靈現象。但這樣的二元論是與自然科學相容的，因為它不與物理定律相衝突，而是在物理定律之外加上心靈定律，加上物理與心靈如何互動的定律，並據此稍稍擴充了我們的存有學。
當然如果僅僅主張如此只是空談，Chalmers認為此方法的確面臨方法論上的困難，但這不代表我們不能內省、觀察、思想實驗等方法給出可能的選項。在此篇文章嘗試給出三個原則，其中兩個，The principle of structural coherence及The principle of organizational invariance是較高階而非基本的，目的在於給一個意識理論發展的方向及限制。而The double aspect theory of information是Chalmers所提出的基本原則。
簡單來說，The principle of structural coherence主張意識(consciousness)的結構與察覺(awareness, direct availability for global control)的結構之間有一致性。也就是說，意識的結構與認知系統處理資訊的結構間，有一個對應關係。The principle of organizational invariance則主張若已足夠細緻的階層來看，兩系統擁有相同的功能，則此二系統會有相同的經驗質感(qualitatively identical experiences)。The double aspect theory of information主張資訊是世界的基本單位，而資訊有物理的面向，亦有經驗的面向。
我想討論的是，在說明The principle of organizational invariance時，Chalmers給的一個論證：若假設此原則為假，意即可能有兩系統功能相同，卻擁有不同的經驗。則我們可以想像此二功能相同經驗不同的系統被不同的材質實現，例如一個感覺紅而被神經細胞實現，另一個感覺藍而被矽晶片實現。而在光譜的此兩端中間，我們可以想像許多的過渡系統，例如一個一個將神經細胞換成晶片。在此光譜上我們可以找到兩系統只差一個細胞，而經驗不同。若我們在其中一個系統裝入一個裝置，此裝置若開關打開，則此系統某細胞的功能由晶片實現，若關則由細胞實現。若我們不斷開關，則此系統應該感覺到變換的經驗。然而由於此系統的功能狀態完全沒有改變，此系統完全沒有察覺此變化的能力，因為它的想法不可能改變。根據歸謬法，此原則為真。
我認為此論證的過程固然沒有問題，但推論本身依賴一個假設，即一個有意識系統的功能複製系統也會擁有意識。但是我們的直覺並不一定接受這一個假設，我們不僅會懷疑在光譜之間的過渡系統有沒有意識，也會懷疑由矽晶片所組成的系統有沒有意識。此論證仍然具有極大的概念澄清的價值，若此論證是沒有問題的，則我們可以說，若一個有意識系統的功能複製系統也會擁有意識，則與其功能相同的系統都會擁有相同的意識，而我們也可以接受另外一種立場，即是一個有意識系統的功能複製系統不一定擁有意識。而究竟何種立場比較符合直覺，我的直覺可能是後者吧！
Reference:
David Chalmers. (2007). Natural Dualism. The Blackwell companion to consciousness pp.359-368
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2007年8月30日 星期四
2007年7月21日 星期六
Michael 哲學論文讀後感 - “The Causal Theory of Mind – D. M. Armstrong"
Author: Michael Hsu (許舜斌)
Date: 7/18/2006
Journal:
Armstrong uses the Causal analysis of mental states to prove that the statement, mental states are physical states of the brain, is intelligible, so scientist can use his framework to explain the mind. The causal analysis explain concepts by the effect of certain cause, but to explain a mental state may be not easy for needing other mental states. For example, how we explain a purpose needs beliefs, other purposes, or perception, so mental states are explained by other mental states. In addition, different mental contents, like a desire for water and a desire for food, are distinguish by the relation between cause, effect, and other mental states, so in this sense I think the causal theory of mind is a kind of holism of mental contents. However, I always have a question about the holism of mental contents, how do we distinguish the same mental content, like a belief about god, in different people? In other words, because in causal theory we distinguish a mental content by other mental states, two identical mental contents should have the same relation among other mental contents in this sense. If a person learns a new belief, the relations among beliefs, desire, etc. are totally different. So, do we say he can’t be found any the same belief?Another debate, which had deal by Armstrong, is about the second qualities, and I think it is the debate about consciousness. Because consciousness has some special properties, like subjectivity and qualitiveness, so physicalists always want to explain away these properties. In this paper, I think Armstrong want to explain away the qualitiveness by arguing the second qualities, which are always taken as a sword against physicalism, are only physical properties in external world. He uses colors to be a example, and he thinks that colors are perceived object, which are in external world. But, in cognitive science we have a lot examples to say colors are created in our brain. For example, the same color surrounding different colors is seen as two different colors, but the same stimulus cause our retina. (sees below link, an example for this kind of illusion) In this sense we receive the same causes from external world, but we don’t have the same colors. So, how does Armstrong explain colors as external properties?
Color Illusion: http://www.grand-illusions.com/square.htm
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Date: 7/18/2006
Journal:
Armstrong uses the Causal analysis of mental states to prove that the statement, mental states are physical states of the brain, is intelligible, so scientist can use his framework to explain the mind. The causal analysis explain concepts by the effect of certain cause, but to explain a mental state may be not easy for needing other mental states. For example, how we explain a purpose needs beliefs, other purposes, or perception, so mental states are explained by other mental states. In addition, different mental contents, like a desire for water and a desire for food, are distinguish by the relation between cause, effect, and other mental states, so in this sense I think the causal theory of mind is a kind of holism of mental contents. However, I always have a question about the holism of mental contents, how do we distinguish the same mental content, like a belief about god, in different people? In other words, because in causal theory we distinguish a mental content by other mental states, two identical mental contents should have the same relation among other mental contents in this sense. If a person learns a new belief, the relations among beliefs, desire, etc. are totally different. So, do we say he can’t be found any the same belief?Another debate, which had deal by Armstrong, is about the second qualities, and I think it is the debate about consciousness. Because consciousness has some special properties, like subjectivity and qualitiveness, so physicalists always want to explain away these properties. In this paper, I think Armstrong want to explain away the qualitiveness by arguing the second qualities, which are always taken as a sword against physicalism, are only physical properties in external world. He uses colors to be a example, and he thinks that colors are perceived object, which are in external world. But, in cognitive science we have a lot examples to say colors are created in our brain. For example, the same color surrounding different colors is seen as two different colors, but the same stimulus cause our retina. (sees below link, an example for this kind of illusion) In this sense we receive the same causes from external world, but we don’t have the same colors. So, how does Armstrong explain colors as external properties?
Color Illusion: http://www.grand-illusions.com/square.htm
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Michael 哲學論文讀後感 - “The Philosophy of Mind _ The nature of mental states – Hilary Putnam"
Author: Michael Hsu (許舜斌)
Date: 7/13/2006
Journal:
The problem of mind is an important issue in philosophy. After the scientific revolution, more and more people, philosophers and scientists, think that dualism is not substantial and mental states must be objective states, which are compatible with physical science. In the twentieth century, there are three important branches explaining the issue. In the first one, coming from logical positivism, they think a mental state can be analyzed in terms of behavioral patterns. The second one identifies brain states with mental states, and it is so called physicalism. The third one, which is the main topic of this paper, is functionalism, it identifies mental states with functional roles or functional states, whose idea comes from Turing Machine. Because functionalism needs to ground the functional state by behavioral patterns, it is an advanced version of behavioralism in this sense. So the debate in the philosophy of mind is turned to the debate between functionalism and physicalism, whether mental states go with physical properties or functional properties. But I think that before answering the debate we need to know what mental states or mental properties are. Consciousness is a taboo before the 1990s, so Putnam didn’t consider this one. I think losing consciousness or conscious properties is the same as losing the mind, so even if we can use objective terms, functional terms or behavioral terms, to explain mental states, we may lose this aspect.Putting aside this question, I think there is another point in the debate, which is the distinction between simulation and reality, because the main argument of this paper against physicalism is the argument from multiple realization. In other words, what are the limitations in computability? Only computable functions simulated in computers can’t be distinguished from reality; in other words, only computable functions can be realized in different physical properties. The contemporary view of computability based on Turing Machine, which is used in Putnam’ s paper, it defines what is computable. Based on Turing Machine, the computable function is limited in the domain of natural numbers. However, there are a lot of functions which are not in the domain of natural number, and a lot of functions, which describe phenomenon in physical world, are this kind of functions. This world may have a lot of important phenomenon which can’t be captured by the functions in the domain of natural number, and we can only use computers to simulate the function in the domain of natural number. So we can’t simulate the mind in this sense, we only can simulate (realize) mind in the same physical realizer. If it is reality, mind only can go with some specific physical property, which can realize this kind of function. However, whether we can extend the range of computability is another question.
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Date: 7/13/2006
Journal:
The problem of mind is an important issue in philosophy. After the scientific revolution, more and more people, philosophers and scientists, think that dualism is not substantial and mental states must be objective states, which are compatible with physical science. In the twentieth century, there are three important branches explaining the issue. In the first one, coming from logical positivism, they think a mental state can be analyzed in terms of behavioral patterns. The second one identifies brain states with mental states, and it is so called physicalism. The third one, which is the main topic of this paper, is functionalism, it identifies mental states with functional roles or functional states, whose idea comes from Turing Machine. Because functionalism needs to ground the functional state by behavioral patterns, it is an advanced version of behavioralism in this sense. So the debate in the philosophy of mind is turned to the debate between functionalism and physicalism, whether mental states go with physical properties or functional properties. But I think that before answering the debate we need to know what mental states or mental properties are. Consciousness is a taboo before the 1990s, so Putnam didn’t consider this one. I think losing consciousness or conscious properties is the same as losing the mind, so even if we can use objective terms, functional terms or behavioral terms, to explain mental states, we may lose this aspect.Putting aside this question, I think there is another point in the debate, which is the distinction between simulation and reality, because the main argument of this paper against physicalism is the argument from multiple realization. In other words, what are the limitations in computability? Only computable functions simulated in computers can’t be distinguished from reality; in other words, only computable functions can be realized in different physical properties. The contemporary view of computability based on Turing Machine, which is used in Putnam’ s paper, it defines what is computable. Based on Turing Machine, the computable function is limited in the domain of natural numbers. However, there are a lot of functions which are not in the domain of natural number, and a lot of functions, which describe phenomenon in physical world, are this kind of functions. This world may have a lot of important phenomenon which can’t be captured by the functions in the domain of natural number, and we can only use computers to simulate the function in the domain of natural number. So we can’t simulate the mind in this sense, we only can simulate (realize) mind in the same physical realizer. If it is reality, mind only can go with some specific physical property, which can realize this kind of function. However, whether we can extend the range of computability is another question.
read more...
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